Objection to Thomas Kelly and Feldman arguments

It is of great importance to see how someone has pointed out his/her evidence based on a given idea on the question and at most cases this evidence is usually the one to be used in deciding on whose argument needs to be accredited. Due to this you will find that most epistemic peers will use this idea to reach a given agreement and would like to have one argument to take and as a result other arguments are left behind resulting to a point of asymmetry meaning that it is difficult to appeal people to symmetry since most people will likely to support the point which has more evidence which is sound while those with few shreds of evidence even if they are sound in most cases they are difficult that other points are added to it to make them symmetrical with the one with concrete evidence.

As a result of this, I object Kelly's argument that people when they review their arguments are likely to reach a point where their thoughts become symmetrical implying that they do not disagree but instead view each other's argument to be correct. When my evidence is always accepted when we are discussing most topics with my fellow epistemic peers I am likely to feel that I am better in evaluating evidence thus can make me demote my fellows from the ranks which I accord them as epistemic peers thus implying that I cannot discuss anything with them due to the fact that I feel I am always the one who has the best evidence. Looking keenly at this you will find that people will not be able at all times to reach a point where their thoughts become symmetrical but instead, other people thoughts are in most cases accepted than others and when they feel that their thoughts are the best they start to demote his fellows.

Feldman argues that a reasonable agreement is arrived at making various conclusions which I refute by saying that conclusions of something might be many to support it but not true for example, if a person has killed someone and this person (killer) is taken to court and he/she employees a lawyer to defend him, the lawyer will likely to draw many conclusions claiming that the accused is not guilty and these conclusions might not be true thus making me claim that basing our arguments on the conclusions we make for them to be reasonable is not true since some conclusions might be based on lies and thus really result to disagreements but they are not resulting to reasonable disagreements. "People might reach at reasonable disagreement without having realized it," Feldman argue, which to me I object because he mentions that they arrived at this after a conclusion have been made which he presumed to be true which to me I say that not all conclusions that people arrive at are true and reasonable as one might accept an idea and concludes that is true yet it is not.

For example, a child who is an orphan might be excelling in academics and someone concludes it seems that his/her parents might have been generous while others concludes that it might be the surrounding conditions which make the child excel because he/she is an orphan and finally they reach conclusions that because he/she is an orphan he/she excel but this not be true because his/her parents might have been genius but evidence for the surrounding conditions have overruled it thus basing that these people have reached a reasonable disagreement without realizing is not true since the other conclusion have been left and yet it was more reasonable. Feldman also argues that the epistemic peers who have shared their evidences are likely to reach at a reasonable disagreement by coming up with conclusions that are reasonable which to me I disagree by saying that at times peers might reach conclusions which are not reasonable even despite having a shared evidence since some might hold to their believe that they are always right and evidence of others is not true but meant to change their mind.

For example, a person who always excels and does not wake up to revise but instead only hears lectures is not easy to convince that waking up in the morning and doing revision will make him excel because to him he/she believes that as long as I have attended the lectures I will excel and thus even give him how many evidences he/she is likely not to believe on you at all since he/she will see that you are a slow learner not like him whom he/she presume himself/herself as genius. In is seen as well in Feldman and Kelly arguments that epistemic disagreements results to consequences that are skeptical and might be found to be objectionable as I have done in this paper as well as surprising and one time might lack the courage to convict on someone and stand on those convictions and even goes further to dig more on his arguments and be ready to go against the current as long as your disagreements are reasonable and have logics in which they are based at and to illustrate this, Matheson reminds us that "after all, humility is an intellectual virtue as well".

Further, Matheson continues to tell us that the view is not a skeptical which is radical or a global view but instead it is a contingent on what is seen as controversial and that skepticism is only limited to those domains. Finally, Matheson conceded that, someone may have views which run and do not have a very good reasons which are epistemic for another person actions and views which have resulted to a disagreement, "this does not entail that there are other reasons (pragmatic, moral, religious, etc. ) to hold a controversial belief". In other cases, there may be other reasons which are simple but instrumental which might make a given belief to be held and though conclusions are skeptical may follow we still have prohibitions on believing or even acting are not necessarily part of the outcome.