Israel Lebanon War 1982 Research

The attempt was done by gunmen from Abu Nidal’s organization. Manacheni Nagin, Israel prime minister, blamed PLO for the incident. He, therefore, treated the incident as a reason for invading Lebanon. The paper will provide an elaborate causes, course, outcomes, and the post war implications. The reason that triggered the Israel-Lebanon war of 1982 is blamed on security threats that PLO and Syrian Army posed on Israel. The possibilities of future wars remain unclear. However, “the key to any long term solution is the restoration of legitimacy” (Kaldor, 2013, p. such a statement may imply that solving the root cause of the war and being just when making treaties could be the final solution that will bring peace between these countries. The War Period Barely eight days after Israel’s invasion, the IDF completely encircled Beirut suggesting that it was a well-planned exercise and the IDF were on the right path towards achieving their objectives.

The IDF destroyed to a greater extent of the PLO infrastructure in the south of Lebanon, mainly to weaken the Palestine Liberation Organization. The above elements favored Israel thus pushing them towards accomplishing their objectives. The success of Israeli Defense Force did not come as a surprise considering their historical reputation for daring, use of advanced technology, adaptation, use of surprise and forth tactics. Past battles had occurred under unique geological contexts, the evolution process of effective and unique doctrine, strategy, and force structure. Israel had also fought several battles and seemed to be experienced in going through wars. Another special lesson that could be noted from the course of the war is Israeli military strategy and doctrine, command and control, evolving military structure, decision-making processes, and Israeli national strategy concerning external wars.

When the invasion started, over 20,000 armed Israeli forces crossed over the Lebanese border and divided into three groups suggesting that it was a well-planned idea. The force for the invasion exercise was made to enable a successful breakthrough and ground forces were established into three combined arms teams. Supply depots and mobile equipment facilities were built in forwarding regions to support the forces so that they could maintain their momentum towards achieving their set objectives. The Israeli ground forces moved fast at exceptional level with few losses against the enemy. The combination of these forces into a single team was achieved through a complex system of cooperation and coordination among the numerous branches of IDF. IDF achieved most of its objectives, and the Israeli military achieved success. The Israeli skillfully coordinated all their troops along all spheres to ensure that the opponents would not have an easy time.

Causes of the War Three essential and mutually related process that was supposed to be tackled by Israeli were taking place in Lebanon in the periods the 1970s and 1980s. The processes made the invasion of Lebanon by Israel inevitable. Some of these processes persisted even after the Israel Lebanon war. Apart from the usual impacts of terrorism such as loss of lives, it has also led to the destruction of properties with billions in its former occurrences. “The above outcomes of any terrorist activity are likely to affect foreign investments and inflow of capital into the country thereby affecting economic growth” (Stewart, 2011, p. Loss of lives and living with the wound is another impact of terrorism that would push a possible victim to try and if any means that would prevent such phenomena from occurring.

About the Israeli-Lebanon war of 1982, It seems the Israelis were not taking any chances, they were not willing to sit back and watch as their enemies grew regarding forces and strength. Besides, they had tried in previous attacks that did not succeed. The indirect dialogue led to a tacit understanding founded on the establishment of a red line. Both sides agreed on that line thus separating Lebanon into two zones; the first zone was the division of Lebanon into a section designed for Syrian activities in the middle and northern parts of the country. The second one was the zone for IDF, in the south of Lebanon where the PLO had based its military forces. Such a direct understanding led to the provision of freedom. Syrian army’s action was on the north of the red line while the Israel Defense Force could limit their operations to the north thus preventing military contact that would lead to confrontation between them.

Such objectives were under threat by the Syrian and the PLO who had their bases in Lebanon and continued to develop terrorist groups. As a result, they had to intervene and solve the situation before it could cause irreversible magnitudes of damages. Israel, therefore, intended to advance strategic-political; and military objectives that would subdue the threat that these groups poised. Destroying the Palestine political and military structure in Lebanon could undoubtedly lead to their crumbling while the Israeli army would emerge as the regional powerhouse. Some of these objectives were met at the start of the war; they managed to bring down the Palestine infrastructure in Lebanon. The same thing happened between Israel and Lebanon; the Israeli offered to assist Lebanese Christians after bypassing the Palestinian authorities. Such a factor is a sign of disrespect thus creating tension.

On the other hand, the oppression that these Christians felt attracted sympathy from Israel. They also had deep connections even before the crafting of the nation of Israel. Secondly, Israel believed that these Christians would help them in fighting terrorists. Israel aimed to weaken the Syrian army and destroy the Palestine Liberation Movement. They achieved some of these goals that implied Syria and PLO had become weak. However, the creation of Hezbollah cropped out of the exercise. “Israel was repeatedly unable to achieve its objectives, they were only partial in doing so” (Freilich, 2012, p. One notable failure on the part of Israel is that they failed to meet their objectives of stopping the war using a peace treaty, a factor that was hindered by several issues between the fighting groups. Such a condition implied that the groups would go on fighting believing that a resolution would come from the act of fighting one another, or the possibility of one group surrendering.

A peace treaty is essentials for the end of several wars. Lack of such a treaty makes it difficult for groups to reach a common agreement. The assassination of Gemayel in September 1982 complicated the war and dealt the possibility of having a treaty a big blow. It led to Israel’s outrage and made them move further interior with the aim of suppressing PLO. S assistance that led the Lebanon and Israel to reach an accord despite the fact that it did not succeed. Yassin's Arafat's decision to withdraw PLO in September 1982 also worked towards easing the tension between the fighting groups. The decision by Israel to withdraw most of its troops in January 1985 also made it possible to manage the conflict. The relationship between Israel and Lebanon has never been a rosy one.

There still exist mistrust between the two countries considering their bitter historical rivalry. However, “Inter-state war, for its part, has undergone a marked decline, driven by a rising body of global norms against such warfare, as well as increasing economic and financial ties between nations” (Briscoe, 2014, p. Regardless, s future war may still occur. Other issues such as natural gas at the border of the true countries have led to disputes that continue to worsen the situation. In case such a war break out again, there is a possibility that it would lead to loss of massive lives compared to the previous wars because advanced technology may be used to destroy opponents. The possibility of negotiating such conflicts can be enabled by diplomatic experts who have managed to settle other world disputes.

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