SOMALIAS FISHERY PIRACY OR PROTECTION OF LIVELIHOOD

Research Hypothesis 9 2 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 10 2. Fishing In Somalia 10 2. Fishing in the Indian Ocean 10 2. The Problem of Illegal Foreign Fishing in the Somali Waters 12 2. The Amount of Foreign Fishing in Somali Waters 15 2. Role of Colonialism 26 5 CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 29 5. Resources 29 5. Circumstances 30 5. Colonial Legacies in Somalia 31 5. The post-Cold War Somali Situation 36 5. Despite the vibrant aquatic life, Somalia’s domestic fishing industry is highly undercapitalized when compared to the other neighbouring countries in East Africa such as Kenya and Ethiopia. The growth of the local fishing industry stalled following the collapse of the then onset of the civil war in and the subsequent collapse of the then government in 1991 (Glaser et al. p3). The civil war raged over the country for more than two decades.

Fishing by the locals in Somalia has remained far below par. The civil war arose as different communities to control the capital city of Mogadishu (Hansen, 2011 p28). Following the collapse of the government in 1991, Somalia has not been able to manage its resources both on land and in water effectively leading to an influx of illegal fishing within the Somali waters. However, fishing in the Somali waters by foreign vessels is not something new. According to Glaser et al. p3), illegal foreign fishing was rampant from the 1950s to 1980s but no major confrontations with the local communities were reported. With no functioning government to protect them, the locals had to come up with ways of defending themselves. This is where piracy was born.

It has become extremely difficult to separate the issue of piracy and fisheries resources in Somalia. Piracy at the coast of Somalia has often been linked with illegal exploitation of the Somali fisheries resources by illegal foreign fishers (Sumaila & Bawumia, 2014 p155). As early as the early 1990s, the local Somali fishers began expressing their frustrations towards foreign fishers following the fall of Siad Barre’s government in the year 1991. At first, the attacks were merely opportunistic, stealing items and other equipment from the vessels. However, in no time the attacks would escalate to hijacking, including commercial vessels, and demand for ransom. The first case of hijacking was reported in 1994, where two Somali High Seas Fishing Company’s vessels were high hijacked and only released for ransom (Kulmiye, 2001 p.

Due to the increasing attacks on the foreign vessels, and lack of a legitimate government to enforce authority, the local warlords recognised a business opportunity. Some of them started selling access rights to the Somali waters to the foreign vessels in exchange for protection (Persson et al. Worse still they even attacked commercial vessels that had nothing to do with fishing whatsoever (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2014 p3). The 2004 tsunami experienced across the world, also served to make the situation worse. The tsunami destroyed many of the fishing equipment and infrastructure along the coastline. The aftermath of the tsunami left tens of thousands of local fishers without any means of livelihood (UN News, 2005 p1). Lack of legitimate government meant that there was no state response to help with those affected.

The international response was effective enough in curtailing piracy and the hijackings of the commercial and other vessels along the Somali coastlines ceased (Oceans Beyond, 2014 p1). However, nothing was done to address the root cause of the problem. The role of foreign fishing vessels in fuelling the piracy was completely ignored (Waldo, 2014, p1). As a result, foreign fishing vessels largely remain a threat to the local fishing communities (Adeso Africa, 2015 p18). The local fishers have been left defenceless with no other form of livelihood. Lack of proper regulations has, in turn, has opened doors for rogue foreign fishing boats to infiltrate the Somali waters. Foreigners have taken advantage of the ambiguous regulations and lack of effective enforcement capacity by the government as well us unrests within the country (Hansen, 2011 p27).

For instance, many of the fishing vessels used by outsiders are more sophisticated than those used by the coastline authorities rendering them ineffective. There is even no advanced motoring systems, the kind used in developed economies, making it impossible to detect any foreign vessels. That said, piracy is not the only way out for the frustrated local fishing communities. Somalia is largely portrayed as a lawless country with many of the young men turned either Al-Shabaab militia of pirates. However, what the media doesn’t say is that the local communities are only trying to defend themselves from exploitations from the West and Asia. Piracy came about as a defence mechanism for the local communities that rely on fishing as a source of their livelihood.

The activities of the sophisticated illegal foreign fishing boats were the root cause of the problem. Responding with fire and fury against pirates is merely an imperialist move. p58). In contrast, the foreign fishing vessels are more advanced and catch a significantly higher amount of fish. However, most if not all the catch by the foreign vessels does not benefit the local Somali economy in any way. Thus, to be able to develop sustainable fisheries in Somalia, then it is imperative that the both legal and majorly illegal fishing need to be constrained, licensed, recorded, and regulated immediately. If achieved, then the licensing revenues can be redistributed to benefit the Somali people. However, since around 2003, the data on the Indian Ocean catch has shown to stagnant at around 4.

million metric tonnes each year; this is according to the UNs Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). When compared to the global figures, on average global capture started to stagnate from the 1980s. This suggests that there has been a lag in fisheries development in the Western Indian Ocean when compared to the other parts of the world (Campling, 2012, p257). However, care should be taken when looking at these numbers because the prevalence of illegal foreign fishing may give a wrong picture because its largely unreported. The most common species captured in the Western Indian Ocean are oil sardine (9%), skipjack tuna (7%), yellowfin tuna (7%), and Bombay duck (4%). About 16% of the total catches in the Western Indian Ocean remain unidentified further adding to the problem of assessing the fisheries potential in the region (Glaser et al.

p43). Figure 1: Marine capture production for the Western Indian Ocean as reported to FAO in 2013 2. The Problem of Illegal Foreign Fishing in the Somali Waters The illegal, unregulated and reported fishing practices in Somalia adversely affect the development of economically sustainable fisheries in Somalia and possess a great risk to the livelihoods of the Somali communities living across the coastlines. Before the passing of this law, it was unclear when it came to the legality of the foreign vessels. The Somali Maritime Code provided for the licensing of all foreign vessels. However, the international community challenged Somali’s claim for territorial waters and would often use this as an excuse to fish even beyond the 12nm Somali waters without obtaining a license.

Some of the vessels that sought to obtain licenses did so from the local clan leaders, local authorities, and even warlords (Hughes, 2011, p3). Thus, in most cases, such licenses were issued to foreign vessels by individuals or organizations that did not have the authority to do so meaning that these foreign vessels were either complicit or ignorant in such dealings. Further, the Federal government has not reported any catch to the FAO for around three decades, that is, from 1988. On the bright side, there have been recent efforts to report catch (Caramerli & Caselli, 2015, p1). For instance, fishers that work for the Somali Fair Fishing, which is an NGO operating within Somalia, have been systematically reporting their catch. Nevertheless, there is need for a well-coordinated national authority that would deal with the reporting of catch within the Somali waters.

Despite both the local and foreign vessels being required to report their catch, there is still no clear-cut mechanisms through which this can be implemented or achieved. With lack of a proper resource assessment and appropriate management policies that are backed by science, then unregulated fishing can result into a depletion of resources which may translate into resource depletion and the collapse of the fishing industry. This is especially detrimental to the Somali fishers than it is to the foreign fishers. This is because foreign fishers can relocated to other fishing grounds as a result of resources depletion. The Somali fishers do not have such capacity, and this may be a death sentence to many of the coastline communities that largely depend on fishing as their only source of livelihood.

Further, the failure to come up with an appropriate and enforceable licenses authority has caused a perception that all non-local fishing vessels are illegal. They had evidence of Iranian, Yemen, China, and South Korea among other countries (Glaser et al. However, much has not changed and the battle against illegal foreign vessels in the Somali waters still rages on. It is the wish of the Somali Government that the revenue obtained from its most important natural resource benefits the local people. The Amount of Foreign Fishing in Somali Waters The lack of proper monitoring and recording fishing in Somalia has made estimating the amount of catch in Somalia problematic. There has never been any systematic, analysis of the amount of catch in the Somali waters.

However, as the fuel prices increased, the Italian trawlers would soon cease their efforts in 2006 which were replaced by the South Korean vessels (Hughes, 2011, p28). Currently, bottom trawling is viewed as illegal since enactment of the Somali Fisheries Law. However, due to the lack of proper monitories and enforcement, these kinds of trawlers even some flagged to Somalia still operate in the Somali waters. It is difficult to understand the full extent of the damage caused by these vessels on fish stock. The numbers can only be estimated given the volatile situation and lack of research in the country. Given the type of competition of the global fishing industry and the overwhelmingly undeveloped Somali fishing technology, it’s unlikely that the locals can take full advantage of this natural resources on their own.

Therefore, licencing of foreign vessels presents a great avenue from which Somalia can raise the much-needed revenue (Persson et al. p209). This can be at least a solution in the short term given that Somalia still has a long way to go before it can develop the technology that would be competitive enough and take full advantage of the fisheries potential within their waters. Development of Fishing in the Western Indian Ocean in general and Somalia in particular has lagged behind when compared to the other regions in the world. On its own, Somali is in no position to successfully fight illegal fishing by foreign vessels in its waters due to lack of capacity as well as the delicate political climate in the country.

If the international community does not take affirmative action, then it’s only a matter of time before piracy re-emerges since illegal fishing by foreign vessels only serves to promote public support of piracy as the local people try to protect their livelihoods. CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 3. Objectives The objective of the study is to explore the complex issue of piracy in Somalia and determine whether it’s actual piracy or protection of livelihood. In carrying out the study, special attention is placed on the colonial and cold war legacies on the conflicts and thus piracy observed in Somalia. However, with the fall of the government, the foreign fishing vessels invaded the Somali waters as there were no authority to impose any meaningful regulation.

Due to the lack of resources, fishing by the local is majorly substance and on a small scale. In contrast, the foreign vessels proved to be too advanced and they could literally sweep all the fish on their way. This meant that there was nothing much left for the local fishermen which threatened their livelihood and even existence. Worse still the foreign vessels populated the water by dumping wastes into the ocean and were even violent towards the local fishing communities where they could destroy their fishing gears and even take their small catch aware from them (Samatar, 210, p1379). Therefore, according to Calmorin et al, (2007, p68) historical research method denotes to the efforts to recount some aspects of the past life.

The procedure involves the investigation, recording, analysing, and interpretation of the past events with the aim of discerning generalizations that are helpful in understanding the past, present, and anticipating the future. Simply, the historical research method involves the application of the scientific inquiry methods to the historical problems (Chitnis, 2006, p40). The historical research method is suitable to this study because the objective of this study is to explore the historical events with an aim of understanding the past. The aim is to explore other people’s observations of on the issue of piracy in Somalia and come up with a generalized truth on what actually happened, why it happened, and anticipate the future. Primary sources are the most solid basis of the historical work (Adams et al.

p31). Primary sources may be of two types. The first type refers to the consciously transmitted information that in the form of written or oral records or testimony written and kept by the action participants or witnesses of an event. It includes official minutes, letters, diaries, charters, constitutions, licenses, declarations, autobiographies, and proclamations among other first-hand accounts. Therefore it is extremely hard to determine how much valid, significant, or reliable the data is unless there is a critical analysis. Thus the appraisal process used to determine the trustworthiness of the data collected is called historical criticism and involves a dual process of internal and external criticism (Meleis, 2007, p241). External criticism involves establishing the genuineness or authenticity of the data so that the researcher does not waste time on counterfeit or forged documents.

It is concerned with the authenticity of the document itself, whether it really is what it purports to be, and whether it is actually the original version (Jayapalan, 2002, p126). External criticism involves procedures that establish the genuineness of the authorship or age of documents. In a bid to overcome such shortcomings and make the study more objective, the researcher also made use of other contemporary sources that tended to be neutral on the subject matter. Therefore, sufficient care was take to make the study impartial and objective. Presentation of Facts Initially, historical writings used to be done in a chronological manner. However, historical materials can also be presented according to a topic or theme. This is known as thematic, topical, or functional arrangement.

In addition, there is a lack of transparency from the international monitoring agencies that work in the Indian oceans, therefore, reluctance to share data. In addition, most of the vessels that fish illegally in the Somali waters do not want to be known and therefore they are as well reluctant to share their positions even in cases of attacks by pirates. For instance, some of the vessels under attack withheld critical position information from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). Many vessels self-report dubious locations to deceive the monitoring agencies and subsequently the public thus making it extremely had to come up with an accurate. According to Persson et al. However, the decline could as well have been caused by the insurgent of the illegal and advanced foreign fishing vessels.

The literature further reveals that the foreign vessel would fish so close to the Somali shows meaning that the local fishing communities were largely affected because due to lack of advanced fishing vessels, the local communities could only manage to fish close to the shore and was very risky to go deeper into the waters (Westberg, 2016, p211). There are also stories that the foreign vessels could attack and destroy the fishing gear of the locals and even rob them of their catch. This fuelled anger among the locals towards the foreign fishers and vessels. Therefore, regardless of the initial reason for the decline of catch and piracy, these actions by the foreign fishers without double had a direct causal effect on the resurgent of Piracy in Somalia.

Therefore, a controlled access to the country’s most valuable resource can form a big source of foreign exchange income for this conflict and poverty stricken East African country. Further, on the examination of the semi-illegal fishing in Somalia, it becomes apparent that those semi-licensed vessels are treading on a thin line. Semi-licensed fishing is based on the situations where the foreign vessels purchase licences and protection from regional and local authorities. For instance, a fishing company may be licensed by a local authority or one warlord but then this does not guarantee safety when the vessels enter waters claimed by another warlord of the perceived local territories. In addition, there has been reporting misuse of revenue collected from this kind of deals where the revenue is used for the benefit of the local warlords as they are used to purchase firearms (Ighobor, 2017, p127).

p1379). With the formation of the federal government in 2012, there is hope that the situation would be resolved very soon. However, the country I far from being stable and it would take the help of the international community in helping enforce fishing regulations in Somalia. Note that the help offered should have the best interest of the Somali people, because, from past experience, the West has shown to intervene only when their interests are at stake (Westberg, 2016, p211). For instance, the recent intervention was merely to protect their ships by flashing out pirates rather helping Somalia protect its waters. Still, the major problem concerned the unification of the two territories into a single state. The leaders of the two states had divergent ideas on how their cooperation would be like after their merger.

Neither Somalia nor Somaliland were prepared for this union. Thus in 1960, when Italian Somalia and British Somaliland united, there already existed almost irreconcilable differences between the south and the north of the newly formed Somali Republic that has haunted the newly found Somalia for decades (Balthasar, 2014, p233). On the unification of Somalia, seeds of instability had already been sawn. The resulting structure of democracy did not integrate the traditional governance structures. The leaders would soon use their government positions to enrich themselves and their families. Even some of the members of the public in the southern parts felt marginalized and used by the political leaders. This new resentment increased the change of violence and became the major reason for the political coup that occurred in the country in 1969 (Tripodi, 1999, p59).

However, these shortcomings were never addressed by the new governments and would soon result into a civil war that led to the collapse of the government in 1991 and decades-long conflict that completely through Somali off tracks in terms of economic growth. Human Development Index (HDI) of 0. ranks among the lowest in the world and is even worse of when adjusted for the significant inequalities that exist within the country (Liddick, 2014, p296). A big part of Somali’s economy is diaspora funded why Somali’s living send money to their family members back at home. It is estimated that about 80% of the Somalis are nomadic pastoralists who keep sheep, goats, cattle, and camels. The Somali economy has suffered a great deal as a result of the civil war that lasted for over two decades hindering development.

Circumstances The definition of illegal fishing in Somalia is somewhat problematic given that some stakeholders even question Somalia’s claim over fisheries jurisdiction of the 200 nm shore. The question is always whether the claim was done properly or not and whether it is acceptable under international law. However, this claims in themselves are dubious since Somalia was an initial signatory to the UN Convention on the law of the Sea (UNCLS). In 2014, the FGS renewed its commitment to the claim and declared its outer limits of the EEZ giving the UN its geographic coordinates (Liddick, 2014, p298). It is obvious that since Somalia is a signatory to the UNCLS, then it has a legal claim over exclusive fisheries rights the 200 nm EEZ.

At representatives also agreed on the establishment of a Federal Somali Fishing Authority (FSFA) that would be tasked with the management of the offshore highly migratory fish stocks, come with the licencing processes and a revenue sharing framework. The policy paper adopted thereafter serves as a legal document that guides fisheries in Somalia for the benefit of the local people. This is due to its effort to solve the legality of Somali claim of its EEZ and putting forwards guidelines that should be used in the regulations of fisheries and revenue sharing for the country’s economic growth (Akiko, 2012, 63). Thus, Somalia has made considerable progress in terms of regulating and monitoring its fisheries the past couple of years. The circumstances have greatly changed compared to 1990s up to late 2000s following the collapse of the government (Akiko, 2012, p65).

Some of the articles suggest that there is still prevalent of colonials more than half a century from independence and it has had a direct impact in retarding the African economic growth and development. On the other hand, others focus on the benefits of colonialism to the African continent. However, one common feature for the two standpoints is that Africa as a continent in a troubled state and is still a long way from the other continents. For instance, Somalia received its independence from British rule in July 1960 (Gueye, 2018, 118). Terrorism, the breakdown of rule of law, and clan-based violence leading to the rise of piracy. This has ensured that the African market is forever faced by market fluctuations. Further, the forced integration into the global economy made the already inequality in resources between Africa and the rest of the world, majorly the West, even worse (Thomson, 2010, p56).

There is no way African products could compete with those of the developed countries. Africa itself rely so much on seasonal agriculture which is their main source of revenue, and the biggest exports. Seasonal fluctuations do not help the African case. Such a strategy was used by the colonialists to provide the European settlers with a cheap form of labour in addition to the control of the natural resources where the Africans were forced to provide cheap labour to these settlers. This was even the case in the peasant colonies where the land largely remained in the hands of the Africans since the Europeans made sure that they monopolised the services sector (Chrisman & Williams, 2015, p25). Forced recruitment of labour was also a common feature where Africans were either forced to work for the individual settlers or the government.

There was also the problem of where the colonialists refused to accept leave alone promote the emergency of markets among African-occupied lands. Thus, colonialism in Africa did not introduce a full-blown capitalist private ownership of property which would foster competition thereby creating a self-sustaining economy. During the colonial period, the current day Somalia was two separate states, that is, the British Somaliland Protectorate in the northern part and the Italian Somaliland in the southern part (Balthasar, 2014, p228) The British rule in Somalia began at around 1884, with the signing of treaties with the local clan leaders. The British rule was indirect where they governed the protectorate through the local leaders. However, there existed social segregations where the Somalis were denied a direct participation in the government (Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, 2016, p3).

The traditional rule was further weakened by the appointment of chiefs for each of the clans in an effort to each administration. These chiefs were provided with stipends which created competition among the clan leaders for the appointment (Garibo-Peyró, 2012, p115). The Italians managed to instil a modern perception towards a centralized government when compared to the British. They also manage to modernize the southern economy more than the British did. However, only a few clans benefited from such an arrangement. Some of the clans became extremely rich while other ended up becoming marginalized (Balthasar, 2014, p230). This destabilised the balance of power that had existed in the community for long. The boundaries were forced on them. This undermined the sovereignty of the of the Somali people which were composed of smaller divided sovereign communities and some of the implications still haunt Somalia up to this day (Garibo-Peyró, 2012, p132).

Colonial imposition of boundaries resulted in the division of territory and made the people more prone to violence. It increased the conflict potential of the Somali people given that there was also a presence of European military which terrorised the local people. The anticolonial struggle that would later ensure in Somalia added another dimension to the traditional inter-community rivalry (Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, 2016, p7). Somalia, in particular, was highly affected by the end of the Cold War led to the withdrawal of the United States’ support of the then president Siad Barre. The resulting in an immediate collapse of the Somali government. However, as a result of the power struggle between the factions that had overthrown the government, this resulted in the fall of the state as conflicts raged through the country (Ohanwe, 2009, p110).

There was the cessation of Somaliland in the northwest part of the country and Puntland declared itself as an autonomy state in 1998 (Baxter, 2013, p36). Ever since there are militia groups spread all over the country. million. Further, between 1974 and 1977 only, the Soviet Union provided Somalia with arms worth about $200 million (Ohanwe, 2009, p110). The readiness and willingness of the United States and the Soviet Union to provide weapons to Somalia encourages an enormous arms flow and worse still diverted development finds into unproductive and dangerous means. President Siad Barre wanted the weapons to keep hold of his doctorial policies and achieve his dream for a Greater Somalia that included seizing some parts of Ethiopia and Norther Eastern Kenya. Following the fall of Barre’s regime in 1991, these weapons ended up scattered in the hands of warlords all over the country.

However, in the late 1970s, the then president of Ethiopia, Mengistu, shifted its alliance from the US to the Soviet Union. During the time, Somalia was in constant conflict with Ethiopia due to Somalis expansionary ambitions that Ethiopia had vehemently resisted. Thus, the cooperation of Ethiopia with the Soviet Union angered President Barre who ditched the friendship with the Soviet Union and expelled its advisers from Somalia (Ohanwe, 2009, p113). The US quickly seized this opportunity and made an alliance with Somalia. Thus, this kind of patron-client game where the superpowers and the clients would switch alignments instigated divisions in Somalia and Africa at large. Somalia has never known peace ever since. It has one of the highest number of refugees in Africa and in the world large.

Further, due to the resources wasted on arms, it’s the most underdeveloped and one of the poorest countries in the world. Impact of Illegal Foreign Fishing The collapse of the state in 1991 meant that there was no authority to meaningfully enforce laws in the country. There was a lack of monitoring and regulations of the Somali Fisheries. Within no time, piracy was crashed, but then the real cause of the piracy was never addressed. Illegal fishing by foreign vessels has continued. Once more the Western Superpowers have shown that they only protect their own interest and do not care about the interest of the Somali people. Even with the formation of an internationally recognized government in 2012, Somalia has never been able to completely curtail illegal fishing by foreign vessels in its waters (Sumaila & Bawumia, 2014, p155).

These continued activities only serve to promote resentment among the local fishing communities towards foreign vessels and also promote public support for piracy. Due to dubious licensing agreements, even the small amount collected does not benefit the people but goes in the hands of a few individuals. As such, Somalia has lagged so much behind in terms of development when compared to its neighbours such as Kenya and Ethiopia. If the lost revenue can be recouped and responsibly used for development purpose, Somalia can develop its fracture and fishing capacity that will help its people take more advantage of their most valued natural resource. Another impact of illegal fishing by foreign vessels is that it brews conflicts and violence. For instance, a number of Yemen fishing vessels have been accused of exchanging weapons and money with the warlords for fishing rights (Sumaila & Bawumia, 2014, p155).

The country only has a handful of paved roads, one airline, and no rail system. Somalia is not an industrialized country. There only exists several industries including meat and fish canaries. Many of the industries that exist were built with international help, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war period. A little bit of oil exploration has been done with some help from the Middle East countries but also the dumping of nuclear waste in the same waters. Following the formation of an international federal government in Somalia, there is some optimism that the situation will change for the better in the near future. The first step will involve restoring peace by crashing the Al-Shabaab militia sects that are spread across the country.

Secondly, it will evolve, coming with workable policies and regulations that will ensure that transparency by eliminating the avenues for corruption. This is much to ask of Somalia for now but then it can be achieved. In fact, it must be done so as to improve the country’s unsustainable work practices. By so doing, the agreement reduces the incentive of the perpetrators to continue operating since they are bond to lose money in the process since their catch cannot reach the market. In addition, other states and relevant international organizations are made aware of the incidents so as to come up with proper measures. Currently, the 57 countries, including Somalia and notably the United States, are party to the PSMA. The PSMA recognizes that effective implementation requires robust institutional, legal, and policy frameworks.

It also requires sound operational mechanisms that can be sustained by ample financial and human resources. However, for the PSMA to become more efficient, the more countries, part need to become a party to the Agreement (Kaunert & Zwolski, 2014, p695). Particularly, the European countries, have proven to be a lucrative market for the fish obtained through IUU fishing, thus more cooperation is required from the European countries. If all countries come on board, then it means that there won’t be any incentive to engage in IUU fishing and that IUU by foreign vessels will be eradicated without having to fire a single bullet and that the international community will not have to worry about piracy in the Somali waters anymore. It is apparent that, only through the principle of cooperation, will Somalia able to protect its fisheries from encroachment by foreign fishing vessels.

Thus, instead of the Western Superpowers sending marines and their naval forces to fight the poor Somalis who are just trying to protect their livelihood, they only need to literally pick up a pen and sign the PSMA which would be a win-win situation for everyone involved except the perpetrators and rightfully so (Thomas, 2017, p68). Steps have been taken to legitimize its legal claim over its EEZ and prevent IUU fishing by foreign vessels for the benefit of the local fishing communities and the entire Somali population as a whole (Gilmer, 2016, p768). Part of the international community has recognized that Somalia need help and a number of efforts have been put in place to help Somalia and other countries prevent IUU fishing by foreign vessels.

For instance, the Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA), which currently has 57 member-states brings about new optimist in the Somalia fishing industry (PSMA, 2018, p1). With such enthusiasm from the Federal Government of Somali and the international community, then Somalia is bound to benefit from its fisheries be it from local fishing or foreign vessels licensing revenue. Licensing of foreign vessels may be a good option in the short run as the country develops its fishing capacity since most of the local fishing endeavours are artisanal in nature. Further, Somalia was dived into two territories, the British Protectorate in the Northern part, and the Italian Somalia in the Southern part. At impendence in 1960, the two protectorates unified into one country. However, due to different political structures adopted by the Italians in the South and the British in the North, there were many differences between the North and the South that were never addressed which would fuel internal conflicts thereby disrupting peace (Kaye, 2014, p323).

The assessment of piracy in Somalia has revealed some important information that may not be found in most of the Western media and literature. The Western media and government have always portrayed piracy in Somalia as dubious and baseless. Foreign fishing vessels would take advantage of the situation and engage in illegal, unlicensed, and unreported fishing activities. Due to overfishing and violence towards the local fishers, the livelihood of the local communities who primarily rely on fishing was threated. The international community turned a blind eye on the same. To defend themselves, they took the guns to the ocean. The Western media does not acknowledge the fact that it is the West that is responsible for the piracy that was recently observed in Somalia.

The West responded by deploying forces into the Horn of Africa to protect their own interests. For instance, the UK government in collaboration with other NATO powers sent their troops to Somalia to curtail the piracy (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2015, p1). In 2009, the United Nations formed the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) with the aim of coordinating actions among UN members in an effort to suppress piracy in Somalia (Tardy, 2014 p7). With no time, piracy was almost non-existent in Somali. However, one question that remained relatively unexplored was why once peace-loving Somali people would engage in piracy. Innovative low-cost technology can be adopted such as the use of cell phones for cell reporting. The fact that many if not all fishermen have cell phones, makes it possible for them to self-report all the catch, including the ones sold at sea, via a text message or mobile apps.

There should however be some occasional auditing at sea to try and improve honesty and thus accuracy of the reported data. With the right incentives, the self-reporting can be a useful tool for this sector. The federal and state Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) systems need to be re-evaluated to set the priorities right. For instance, the management of the near shore fisheries should be delegated to the state authorities while the federal government deals with the larger scale and all foreign vessels fishing in Somali EEZ. Some fish stocks such as the tuna are shared among the region and therefore the federal government should take charge of the coordination with the regional fisheries authorities. In addition, collaborative management schemes need to be established as well.

Further, the role of clan leaders should not be ignored as they play an important part in the co-management of traditional institutions. Such bodies will act as the primary agents for the fisheries management thus playing a decisive role the combating of IUU fishing in the Somali waters as they are in a position to adopt and implement the federal and state management measures. The instrument focus on the state and flag state responsibilities, port state measures, regional management organizations, and other internationally agreed upon market-related measures. Although the instrument is voluntary, it addresses most of the requirements of the developing countries and would be an important instrument for Somalia. Simply, Somalia needs to actively participate in regional and international fisheries agreements.

This us because it is in Somali’s interest in participating in the international agreements as they offer the best solution to deterring illegal IUU fishing in its waters. In addition, Somalia needs to provide opportunities to its small-scale fisheries by building supporting infrastructure. This can be achieved through mass media marketing campaigns where local consumers should be encouraged to consume fish as a source of nutrients. Studies should also be done on why fish consumption is law and find ways of promoting it. This may involve understanding the type of fish people love and other cultural beliefs that may hinder consumption. The marketing campaigns can then be based on the results of such studies. Also, it is important for the federal and state governments to try and incorporate fishing into the mainstream Somali society.

Having established the main cause of piracy in Somalia, questions remain on the treatment of those individuals caught engaging in piracy. Most of the time, they have been shot dead by the military, majorly from the Western countries. Those lucky enough to escape with their lives have found themselves behind bars in very bad. However, many of these people are only trying to defend their livelihoods. Mechanism should therefore be put in place to ensure that instead of being killed or incarcerated, they should be enrolled in reform programs and supported financially to engage in legitimate fishing or activities. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing in the Territori al Waters of Somalia. Nairobi, Kenya. Adeso Africa, pp. Ahluwalia, P.  Politics and post-colonial theory: African inflections.

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